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The term “artifact” currently does not have a formal deﬁnition within the domain of cyber/
digital forensics, resulting in a lack of standardized reporting, linguistic understanding
between professionals, and efﬁciency. In this paper we propose a new deﬁnition based on
a survey we conducted, literature usage, prior deﬁnitions of the word itself, and similarities
with archival science. This deﬁnition includes required ﬁelds that all artifacts must have
and encompasses the notion of curation. Thus, we propose using a new term e curated
forensic artifact (CuFA) e to address items which have been cleared for entry into a CuFA
database (one implementation, the Artifact Genome Project, abbreviated as AGP, is under
development and brieﬂy outlined). An ontological model encapsulates these required
ﬁelds while utilizing a lower-level taxonomic schema. We use the Cyber Observable
eXpression (CybOX) project due to its rising popularity and rigorous classiﬁcations of
forensic objects. Additionally, we suggest some improvements on its integration into our
model and identify higher-level location categories to illustrate tracing an object from
creation through investigative leads. Finally, a step-wise procedure for researching and
logging CuFAs is devised to accompany the model.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Introduction
Currently, the use of the term “artifact,” or “artefact”
(United Kingdom spelling), in relation to digital information and cyber/digital forensics embodies a variety of
meanings depending on the context used as well as the
perspective of the user. The term has generally been
adopted within the cyber forensics domain for items of
interest that help an investigation move forward.
Notwithstanding, the lack of a formal deﬁnition and sound
ontology is holding the ﬁeld back from forming standards
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to keep pace with cybercrime (Brinson et al., 2006). Note
that the term should not be confused with the software
development interpretation of the word (a tangible byproduct produced during software development, especially pertaining to such methods/processes).1
Without a systematic ontology, scientists and practitioners have different ideas of how knowledge is related
within the context of their situations. Ontology provides an
essential “unifying map of concepts and relationships” (for
more explanation on the importance and creation of ontologies/taxonomies see Malafsky and Newman (2009)).
Chieﬂy, professionals (in different subdomains) cannot
easily share evidence and often are forced to rely exclusively on their own past experience during investigations,
1
http://forensicswiki.org/wiki/Computer_forensics#Artifact
accessed Feb. 2, 2016).

(last
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1742-2876/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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which may cause missed evidence or leads. This becomes
extremely important with the ubiquity of devices and
software applications used today. Adopting an ontological
system should increase the ability to bring to light connections investigators are unaware of, such as linked cases
that involve the same criminal, or missing data in a speciﬁc
location that indicates system tampering.
In addition to the ontology, it is important to develop a
standardized taxonomy so that reports can be developed by
software/investigators easily via a procedure for the process of researching and handling items (curation). By using
dynamic (optional) and required ﬁelds, artifacts extracted
using various tools would be directly comparable. Currently
this is not the case for cyber forensics (e.g. “SerialNum” on
Windows vs. “Serial Number” on OSX), even though such
classiﬁcation exists for biological forensics (Brady et al.,
2014). The open-source CybOX project2 is one increasingly popular attempt at standardizing such ﬁelds. Object
types encapsulate these ﬁelds making items placed in them
close to mutually exclusive, but like the prior example there
lacks details that help experts enter data on cyber items
(ﬁles, processes etc.). Conventions are especially lacking
with respect to presentation of evidence in courts (Bariki
et al., 2011).
Our contribution aimed to solve the aforementioned
challenges (standardization/cohesive understanding and
standardization of practitioner-oriented information
exchanging). Primarily, a survey was designed to ask
practitioners and researchers how they would deﬁne a
“digital forensic artifact”. Based on this, previous adoptions
in academic literature, and the domain of archival science
we accomplished the following:
1. Proposed a more concrete, uniﬁed linguistic deﬁnition,
assigning it a new name: Curated (digital) Forensic
Artifact (CuFA).
2. Using survey responses and our proposed deﬁnition, we
designed an ontological model for curation of artifacts
that involves a procedure and sets the requirements for
an object to be considered a CuFA.
3. Presented a manner for implementing the higher-level
ontology in conjunction with a low-level schema
(CybOX) resulting in a searchable database organized by
dynamic, taxanomic ﬁelds and tags/ﬂags.
The structure of this paper is as follows: ﬁrst, we cover
past deﬁnitions/usage of the term “artifact” (Developing a
deﬁnition section), review previous ontologies (Outlining
an ontological model section), and deliver a brief comparison to archival science. Next, our survey methodology
(Methodology section) and design (Survey design section)
are introduced, followed by the data in the Results section.
Using these ﬁndings we propose a deﬁnition and an
ontological model based on this deﬁnition in the Proposed
deﬁnition and model section. Finally, discussion and suggestions for future work are presented to the reader.

2

http://cyboxproject.github.io (last accessed Feb. 2, 2016).

Previous work
Developing a deﬁnition
This section reviews past deﬁnitions of the term “artifact” in the context of digital evidence, the types of items
both researchers and organizations have used the term to
describe (including the perspective that drives these usages), and previously proposed ontologies.
Deﬁnitions
All deﬁnitions listed below are word-for-word.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) deﬁnes “artifact” as:
 An accidental effect that causes incorrect results.
 Something characteristic of or resulting from a particular human institution, period, trend, or individual.
 A product of artiﬁcial character (as in a scientiﬁc test)
due usually to extraneous (as human) agency.
Oxford Dictionaries (2015) lists:
 An object made by a human being, typically an item of
cultural or historical interest.
 Something observed in a scientiﬁc investigation or
experiment that is not naturally present but occurs as a
result of the preparative or investigative procedure.
Dictionary.com (2015)'s deﬁnitions include:
 Any object made by human beings, especially with a
view to subsequent use.
 A substance or structure not naturally present in the
matter being observed but formed by artiﬁcial means.
 A spurious observation or result arising from preparatory investigative procedures.
 Any feature that is not naturally present but is a product
of an extrinsic agent, method, or the like.
More speciﬁc deﬁnitions were obtained from the CybOX
project (MITRE Corporation, 2015):
 An object produced or shaped by human craft, especially
a tool, weapon, or ornament of archaeological or historical interest.
 A phenomenon or feature not originally present or expected and caused by an interfering external agent, action, or process.
Another digital-scoped deﬁnition came from the Scientiﬁc Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging
Technology (SWGDE/SWGIT, 2015):
 Information or data created as a result of the use of an
electronic device that shows past activity.
There were a few instances where papers made explicit
attempts to bound their usage of the term, and therefore
provided a deﬁnition. In one case it was stated that artifacts
should not be confused with Indicators Of Compromise

V.S. Harichandran et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S125eS137

(IOCs), items that signify a system's compromise, as their
intent is different and they represent pure data without
logic, i.e. a system state rather than malware state (Castle,
2014b). The example Castle gave: an IOC might be an
executable that contains a string “evil” or is signed “stolen
cert,” while an artifact could be the location where
user runkeys are located (HKEY_USERSy%%users.sid%%y
SoftwareyMicrosoftyWindowsyCurrentVersionyRuny*U).
Wikipedia contradicted this by using the word “artifact”
in the deﬁnition of IOC.3 Castle's IOC deﬁnition also
disagrees with the previous usages presented in the
Perspectives and usage section. SysAdmin, Audit,
Networking, and Security (SANS) deﬁnes an artifact as a
“combination of description, location, and interpretation” (Castle, 2014a).
The commonality between these deﬁnitions appears to
be observed artiﬁciality/external force, antecedent temporal relation, and exceptionality (based on either accidental
procurement, rarity, or a person's interest). Including the
word “forensic” at the beginning of the term adds legality
and science to this list. These cannot be used exclusively to
form a deﬁnition, however e academic and community
usage must be examined.
Perspectives and usage
Citations of the term “artifact” in cyber forensics have
varied based on the professional goals of the users' subdomains and the tasks they were performing. Reviewed
papers (see the table in the Appendix for the full list of
papers and perspectives) used the word mostly in an ad hoc
manner that reﬂected the concept of exceptionality via
personal interest; thus, this perspective was the most
variant and the term took a different speciﬁc meaning in
each paper (e.g. log data in Yasin and Abulaish (2013) vs.
installation/runtime/deletion behaviors in Lim et al.
(2010)).
A second trend recorded was that of investigators. Usages of the term in these papers emphasized looking
generally for “what you want to know” in order to further
an investigation and, consequently, had a broader intention
than the academic standpoint. Between these two extremes laid the perspective of those who design, manufacture, and test tools. The primary motive behind this view
is the objective of standardizing objects for tagging (or
ﬁlling in ﬁelds/checkboxes), reporting, comparison
(exporting to share), and increased investigative efﬁciency.
Note that although this seems similar to the investigative
stance, these papers detracted the logical, conceptual aspects described above and attempted to focus on the
location and data itself.
Table 1 shows an excerpt from the table in the
Appendix. Each paper's focus was categorized into one of
the above perspectives, or the collection perspective
described in the next section, so that the various mindsets
could be weighted in our proposed model. The investigative ethos was usually used in conjunction with another
one and therefore cannot be found in the table; we declare

3
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title¼Indicator_of_
compromise&oldid¼666037196 (last accessed Feb. 2, 2016).
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Table 1
Excerpt from the Appendix to exemplify the structure of the full table.
Items

Category

Paper &
perspective

Apple system log; Crash reporter;
OSX
Sandvik, 2013*
Diagnostic messages; FSEvents API;
Researcher
Preference settings; Saved application
state; Spotlight; Swap ﬁles/paging/
cache; Temporary data;
Prefetch; Thumbnail cache; Paging ﬁle;
Windows
Registry; Windows search;
Bash history; GVFS virtual ﬁle system;
Linux
Recently used; X session manager;
Note that papers marked with an asterisk did not have explicit categorization of items and required the authors to devise educated groupings.

the more prevalent view. Note that papers marked with an
asterisk did not have explicit categorization of items and
required the authors to devise educated groupings.
Outlining an ontological model
Casey et al. (2015) reviewed past ontologies and
stressed that “querying data on the basis of high-level behaviors […] can be more powerful than just searching for
low-level digital artifacts”. In this section, we highlight the
advantages and disadvantages of these ontologies and
introduce the CybOX model. These will be used to feature a
basic ontological model, delivered in the Proposed
deﬁnition and model section, stemming from our proposed deﬁnition.
Traditionally, “ontology” involves the study of existence, the categories of being, and their relationships.
However, in computer science the “intention is distinct: to
create engineering models of reality, artifacts which can be
used by software, and perhaps directly interpreted and
reasoned over by special software called inference engines, to imbue software with human level semantics”
(Poli et al., 2010). This form of ontology is sometimes
referred to as “Little o” ontology, while “Big O” ontology
signiﬁes the philosophy-centered deﬁnition. There is some
overlap between the two, but we were primarily concerned with “Little o”. Note, hereafter we use the term
“model” as an umbrella term for both an ontology (we
deﬁne this as high-level) and a taxonomic schema (we
deﬁne this as technical/low-level).
Ontologies
Before reviewing the conceptual ontologies and technical schemas proposed in the last few years it is important
to understand what problems these models attempt to
solve. Knowledge and correlation are the main concerns for
investigators, i.e. knowing where artifacts are located,
knowing how they can assist a case, and connecting artifacts across locations/devices when they may be recorded
in different ways (Brady et al., 2014). As stated in the
Introduction, increasing the chances of ﬁnding leads an
investigator is unaware of is also a top priority, whether
this be an unfamiliar ﬁle type, missing data that indicates a
system's state has been changed, or a criminal's modus
operandi. A feature many of the following ontologies have
is extensibility e the advantage of representing low-level
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taxonomic data in a way that can be utilized ﬂexibly by
high-level ontologies. We categorize these models as a
fourth type of perspective in addition to the perspectives
presented in the Developing a deﬁnition section, that of a
(database) collector/designer.
The Forensic Wiki4 represents a loose catalog of tools,
types of digital objects obtained from them, and general
cyber forensics topics. However, Brady et al. (2014) identiﬁed that its “value would be further enhanced if it used
some form of classiﬁcation or tagging system that allowed
examiners to readily access what artifacts were available
and how these could be linked across its various categories”. The authors suggested to solve these issues by
proposing the Digital Evidence Semantic Ontology (DESO),
an investigative perspective of data that views artifacts
through the scope of location or type superclasses.
In DESO, superclasses inherit other subclasses and attributes. For example, the location class may inherit devices, ﬁle systems, and operating systems subclasses
(describing speciﬁc categories of locations), while the type
class may inherit device identiﬁer and logical identiﬁer
subclasses. When attempting to further an investigation
the two primary classes accompany each other. If an
investigator has obtained a speciﬁc artifact they may use
the location class to look for that artifact type across
different devices, ﬁle systems, and operating systems;
alternatively if the type class is the same for artifacts
extracted from various locations they can be compared
directly.
Other high-level ontologies include Structured Threat
Information eXpression (STIX), Digital Forensics Analysis
eXpression (DFAX), and Uniﬁed Cyber Ontology (UCO)
(Casey et al., 2015). STIX uses CybOX (presented in the next
subsection) to represent technical details (e.g. malicious
IPs) in a manner that mirrors subdomain-speciﬁc information such as threat actors. It is the predecessor to DFAX
which also attempts to use a third-party schema within a
broader ontology to capture more procedural aspects such
as chain-of-custody, case management, or processing.
Fields such as ActionPattern and ActionLifecycle allow users
to adopt them for documenting the investigative process,
and ﬁelds for recording event times allows piecing together
timelines and collusion between criminal entities. UCO is
an ontology illustrating even more abstract concepts that
are linked across the cyber forensics domain. It requires the
usage of a lower-level schema and potentially could use
more than one schema at the same time for different
subdomains.
Schemas
In this subsection we brieﬂy describe the pros/cons of
the following schemas: XML Information Retrieval
Approach to digital Forensics (XIRAF), Digital Forensics
XML (DFXML), and Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX).
XIRAF was a prototype for an XML-based schema proposed
by the Netherlands Forensic Institute, but its use of
parentechild relationships between objects limited its
ﬂexibility and it did not gain anticipated prominence

4

http://forensicswiki.org (last accessed Feb. 2, 2016).

outside of the Netherlands. A subsequent XML-based
proposition was DFXML, also an attempt to introduce a
structure to the presentation of objects (Garﬁnkel, 2012).
Although the format enabled cross-platform comparison
and sharing, it still has not been adopted as a standard,
perhaps because XML is a verbose language or because
some think it is too limiting (without an accompanying
ontology).
Recently, CybOX has gained popularity due to its opensource nature and rigorous classiﬁcation scheme for objects. CybOX utilizes a long list of required and optional
attributes for each object type, which it classiﬁes mainly by
where the artifact came from conceptually. Each object is
given a Globally Unique Identiﬁer (GUID) to make it easily
searchable in a database. One concern CybOX addresses is
recording the state of a system before and after an event
(e.g. version of a ﬁle). Differences can be logged speciﬁcally
(new ﬁle created, timestamp) or statistically (similarity
digest). CybOx has begun to be implemented in Trusted
Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) and
other models (Casey et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it lacks the
ontological vantage point of high-level ontologies like
DFAX e thus, we use it as the low-level building block for
our model.

Archival science
Novel work by Dietrich and Adelstein (2015) made
comparisons between the ﬁelds of cyber forensics and
archival science. Both ﬁelds use procedures involving
acquiring, authenticating, and preserving items in a way
that minimizes alterations (and documents them). Aside
from maintaining their integrity, items must be able to be
easily retrieved for future examination and analysis. As
stated by the authors, this is one area where cyber forensics
differs from archival science: “most criminal forensic organizations have no long-term data preservation and
maintenance policy beyond physical storage”. Thus, this
should also be considered when attempting to develop a
deﬁnition; the aspect of curation is what gives items the
name “artifact” and sets them apart from items not
analyzed within procedures followed by experts.
Survey
Methodology
The following basic methodology was applied in carrying out the survey:
1. Performed comprehensive literature review which
informed the researchers that there was neither a
consensus in the usage of the term “artifact” nor a concrete deﬁnition.
2. Designed a survey around asking respondents to deﬁne
the term and list possible categories/ﬁelds that would
help organize such items.
3. Obtained a category two exemption from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of New
Haven restricting the survey from recording participant

V.S. Harichandran et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S125eS137

identiﬁcation information or behavior, and disclaiming
that it posed risk or harm to subjects not encountered in
everyday life.
4. Distributed the survey via list servers and LinkedIn.
5. Retrieved data by exporting the coded responses to an
XLSX ﬁle from the survey system.
6. Analyzed the data for creation of the deﬁnition and
ontology in conjunction with past work.

Survey design
Questions were formulated based on what the authors
found in literature e a missing cohesive deﬁnition for the
word “artifact” in the context of the domain, and absence of
a comprehensive ontology for entering and organizing such
items based on static and dynamic ﬁelds. There were two
iterations of the survey and a testing round before opening
it to the community. The survey consisted of 70 questions:
 54 Likert scale
 12 free response
 4 multiple choice
According to IRB regulations at our institution, participants could not be forced to answer any single question.
The target audience was all professionals in the ﬁeld who
had encountered items referred to as “artifacts”.
Results
A brief note about the Likert scale ﬁgures in this section:
Each bar represents one Likert scale question; approximate
percentages for each answer selection are displayed within
their respective segment; and the number of respondents
per question is visible in brackets to the right of each bar.
The survey was open for 2 months before data was
exported from the survey system.5 There were 87 respondents, but 50 of them were excluded for only
answering demographic questions; the results summarized
below only account for the other 37 participants. It is likely
this occurred because these participants wanted to just
view the survey questions. A power calculation was not
performed for the data because it is mostly descriptive/
qualitative, lacking any statistical inferences; we recommend the results be used for determining the effect size for
any followup work. As seen in Table 2, more than half of the
respondents were Americans, had at least 7 years of
experience in digital forensics, and were over the age of 34.
Respondent expertise can be viewed in Fig. 1.
Since there was no strong agreement on the deﬁnition
of a forensic artifact, the responses in the survey spanned a
myriad of positions. The general themes are shown below,
many of which involve direct quotations. In the following
results parenthetical numbers next to responses indicate
the number of times a general idea or speciﬁc words were
mentioned.

5
Raw data, tabulation, graphs, and the survey itself are publicly
available on our website: http://www.unhcfreg.com.
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Table 2
Numbers in the table are rounded and thus may exhibit rounding
error. The following was not disclosed: two people did not rate
their expertise in computer forensics, one did not rate expertise
for non-traditional forensics, two didn't describe their experience
in the ﬁeld, and one person did not disclose their gender. These
percentages only account for the 37 that answered the nondemographic questions.
Percentage
Age
18e24
3
25e34
30
35e44
24
45e54
30
55e64
11
65e74
3
75 or older
0
Gender
Female
16
Male
81
Other
3
Country
Antigua and Barbuda
3
Argentina
3
Canada
5
Germany
8
India
5
Russia
3
Togo
3
Turkey
3
United Arab Emirates
3
United Kingdom
14
United States
51
Region
North America
57
Europe
22
Asia
8
Middle East
5
Africa
3
Caribbean
3
South America
3
Years work experience in digital forensics
1e3 years
24
4e6 years
22
7e9 years
16
10 years or more
38

 Something that has “evidentiary value” in a legal proceeding (7).
 The results of “applying digital forensic (analysis) techniques” (4).
 Byte stream/sequence (2).

Fig. 1. Results of demographics questions which asked respondents how
much they considered themselves experts in the stated subdomain.
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 Something of probative interest/yielding information
about a digital device (2).
 Digital item/data (2).
 Smallest unit of evidence that can make sense for a
digital investigation (timestamp, database entry, etc)
(2).
 Something used to reconstruct a crime/events (1).
 File states (1).
 An extraction with an established “data type” (1).
 Semantically annotated metadata (1).
As mentioned in the Introduction, it was important to
ﬁnd a procedure to research and process items. Two
separate free response questions asked respondents to
reveal their “investigative process” with familiar and unfamiliar artifacts. Four procedures were mentioned for the
ﬁrst question (familiar) and six procedures for the second
(unfamiliar). Since mostly similar steps were stated in both
questions, we combined these into a proposed procedure
for general guidance, which we hope will serve as a method
of standardization to be taught to training professionals:
1. Acquire (identify which tool the artifact came from).
2. Backup.
3. Check database to see if encountered before (this can
be done by comparing hashes or ﬁelds).
4. If familiar, do quick search in artifact database to see if
methods used previously are still applicable/effective. If
they are, use them, then jump to step 8. If they aren't or
the artifact is unfamiliar continue to next step.
5. Classify into a category using the proposed ontological
model and catalog/extract artifact qualities (taxanomic
ﬁelds used in schemas).
6. Attempt to use techniques effective for that category. If
ineffective, repeat steps 4e6 until effective and skip to
step 8.
7. If no effective techniques are encountered try reconstruction to see if the artifact can be recreated or
reverse engineered. Usage of a hex editor may be
useful.
8. After a technique is successful in analyzing, repairing,
isolating, or rendering the artifact harmless the process
should be documented (with all relevant artifact ﬁelds)
and outputted to a report.
9. Examine the system for associated artifacts based on
what was discovered/learned. This may involve
searching the database for artifacts of the same type, or
using the pointers in the artifact's database entry to
browse potentially related artifacts in other locations.
10. Prepare the reports of each (type of) artifact for supporting a legal case.

Finally, the survey also aimed to devise a schema for
organizing and archiving items through the identiﬁcation
of descriptive taxanomic ﬁelds (that can ﬁt into high-order
categories). The survey already presented ﬁles, databases,
registry, and hardware as categories. The ﬁelds respondents
mentioned were: ﬁles (6), network packets (6), memory/
memory dumps (4), application data (3), registry entries
(2), type & location (2), operating system (2), data

Fig. 2. Results of questions which asked respondents if the stated item
should be considered a forensic artifact.

structures (2), email & webpages (2), metadata (1), sockets
(1), ﬁle system (1), hashes (1), stored/volatile (1), category
matches between subﬁelds (1), external corroborating
sources (1), processes (1), software (1), users (1), and device
conﬁguration (1). Some thought artifacts should be categorized by something more dynamic such as a tree (3),
purpose/action (2), and physical/logical/data containers (1).
We decided that these taxanomic ﬁelds were well
incorporated into CybOX and consequently should be used
to improve it. Figs. 4e7 illustrate that most ﬁelds from the
survey were deemed important to document by the respondents. Some of these are present in CybOX objects
already; others are not and should be incorporated in the
future. Furthermore, Fig. 2 (smartphone and laptop items)
and Fig. 3 (hardware category) indicate that most professionals did not strongly support hardware classiﬁcation
as artifacts, when compared to the other responses.
Limitations
Although the sample size was large enough for the
purposes of this paper, a larger sample would have been
desirable. However, our size should be acceptable due to
the modest size of the cyber forensics domain. Consulting
sizes of organizations, forums, and groups, such as the
Digital Forensics Training group on LinkedIn or the First
Forensic Forum,6 is the only current measure of the target
audience at the moment. Even so, these can still be
considered small since a basic search will result in much
larger populations for other domains.

6

https://www.f3.org.uk (last accessed Feb. 2, 2016).
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Fig. 3. Results of questions which asked respondents if the stated category
should exist for digital forensics artifacts.

Fig. 6. Results of questions which asked respondents if the stated ﬁeld
should exist for describing artifacts in the Registry category.

Fig. 4. Results of questions which asked respondents if the stated ﬁeld
should exist for describing artifacts in the Files category.
Fig. 7. Results of questions which asked respondents if the stated ﬁeld
should exist for describing artifacts in the Hardware category.

Deﬁnition

Fig. 5. Results of questions which asked respondents if the stated ﬁeld
should exist for describing artifacts in the Database category.

Free response questions had a wide variety of answers
due to different interpretations (and misunderstandings) of
the questions' abstract nature. Many answered within the
context of low-level implementation and schemas. These
speciﬁc answers (not the respondent) had to be disregarded (often they were reiterations of things that
already existed in prior work). This could have been eliminated by stating the scope more clearly in each question,
rather than simply in the disclaimer at the beginning of the
survey, which most participants of surveys tend to skip. The
survey design could also have been enhanced by having a
“decline to respond” option to encourage response rate and
minimize “missing data.”

Proposed deﬁnition and model
This section describes our proposed deﬁnition, ontological model, and reiterates the importance of having a
procedure like the one proposed in the Results section.

In creating a deﬁnition for a forensic artifact we consulted archaeology and archival science. The process of
recovering, documenting, and storing objects deﬁnes items
as artifacts in these domains. Consequently, we added the
word “curated” to the term to make this explicitly understood by the community e Curated (digital) Forensic Artifact (CuFA).
By culminating the ﬁndings from the survey (only the
top two most frequent themes from the bullet point list)
presented in the Results section and the summation of
previous deﬁnitions and common usages (Appendix) discussed in the Developing a deﬁnition section we propose
the following stipulations for the linguistic-conceptual
deﬁnition of a CuFA:
 Must be curated via a procedure which uses forensic
techniques, such as the one proposed in the Results
section.
 Must have a location in a useful format (when
applicable).
 Must have evidentiary value in a legal proceeding.
 Must be created by an external force/artiﬁcially.
 Must have antecedent temporal relation/importance.
 Must be exceptional (based on accident, rarity, or personal interest).
Despite everything on a computer actually having a
location, one must remember that the purpose of a CuFA is
to ﬁnd evidence on varying systems in order to improve
future investigations. Therefore, location must be represented in a meaningful format that is most likely static
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between different devices; the most stable/default format
would be disk-related. In other words, memory location is
unreliable across devices due to their allocation and runtime usage being different. Disk partitions, sectors, and
other representations such as the location of user runkeys
mentioned by Castle in the Developing a deﬁnition section
are more likely to aid practitioners in looking for evidence
across varying models and types of hardware (and maybe
even different versions of the same operating system). If no
useful format is possible we allow this requirement to be
absent (all other requirements must still be met).
Since the deﬁnition demands the object be of “evidentiary value” we suggest this requirement be implemented
with a tag/ﬂag, which would indicate whether the speciﬁc
CuFA had been successfully submitted and used in a court
of law before or not. Although we found the researcher
perspective to be the most common of usages, we prefer to
leave this out of the formal deﬁnition since it is a consequence of usage without a standardized deﬁnition.
Regardless, many of the items from the papers in the
Appendix would remain identiﬁed as artifacts under the
CuFA deﬁnition.
Ontological model
Based on the aforementioned deﬁnition and previous
work, we established an ontological model shown in Fig. 8.
The requirements from the proposed deﬁnition attempted
to unify the variety of items that would be present in a CuFA
database; for something of interest to be considered a CuFA
it cannot be missing any of these ﬁelds (except location).
Thus, items of unknown signiﬁcance should be referred to
as potential CuFAs or simply items of interest.
As the results of the survey made evident, location is a
consistently desired piece of information, so we determined that using a high-level categorization for it would be
useful; hence the Location type ﬁeld. In addition, it will be
necessary to store the location of other related CuFAs that
were found for a case when making a database entry. In
other words, entries should be made after investigations
are ﬁnished and types of items have been established as
evidence, resulting in a linked list (of pointers) of unique
CuFAs that traces the leads investigators took. Although
searching by location and type as Brady et al. (2014) suggested to ﬁnd new potential CuFAs will still be performed,
we feel this extra amount of detail will help investigators
better understand the course of action at a brief glance.
Possibly, this will resolve the current uncertainty of not
knowing how to categorize CuFAs that act as containers for
other items, because it will allow layers of abstraction to be
clearly understood. For this reason we think a mandatory
tag should exist for all entries to show whether the CuFA
was a container (found within another CuFA).
This cannot stand on its own though. We decided that
CybOX was an excellent, concrete low-level schema to help
discoverers curate their artifacts when uploading them to a
database such as the AGP (the AGP is currently under
development; see Future work for more information). Details of CybOX's design will not be discussed but one area of
improvement was identiﬁed: CybOX should involve subﬁelds. This is often a matter of design left to the

programmer that creates the system. Still, breaking up
location ﬁelds into disk sector/partition, ﬁlepath, key/value
pairs, and so on would help to keep interpretation consistent and comparable across platforms and agencies. Similar
subﬁelds should be present for other ambiguous ﬁelds (e.g.
Device ﬁeld in Fig. 8), and at least one of the subﬁelds
required to be completed.
Once more, location must be thought of in terms of the
deﬁnition. If a CybOX object has a location-related ﬁeld it
may be used to satisfy the CuFA location requirement, as
long as it represents a lowest-common denominator
format which allows discovery of the CuFA across systems
in the future. But it is not mandatory. Stating the physical
location of an item only existing in memory would not aid
investigation because this would differ between devices.
This does not mean all CybOX objects which satisfy the
location requirement have an explicit location ﬁeld. The
Windows Registry Key object type has key and subkey ﬁelds
which would help locate said objects on disk for different
devices. Even though this data may be copied into memory,
where an investigator may retrieve it from, the lowestcommon denominator format (keys and subkeys on disk)
would be logged as the CuFA requirement.
The goal of this type of schema is comprehensiveness
along with ﬂexibility. Brady et al. (2014) mentioned that
Encase Case Analyzer can document ﬁndings in a SQLite
database, but the terminology is inconsistent. Our model
could still be used alongside other models (CybOX could be
replaced, accompanied, or altered) but would help standardize the items that are entered into databases, the way
they are logged, and how investigators interpret the information (leveraging a more investigative viewpoint).

Conclusions
In this paper we identiﬁed requirements all items
should have in order to be considered an artifact, and
additionally stated that foregoing a curation process should
be a new standard within the ﬁeld. Thus, we suggested all
items that meet these artifact requirements be named
CuFAs.
Location type was introduced, centered around the creation location of an item, to incorporate this deﬁnition into
an ontological model. The model cannot stand on its own
though and needs to be coupled with a low-level
implementation.
When comparing the results of the survey with the list
of items/ﬁelds on ForensicArtifacts.com and other sources,
it became clear that current models, including CybOX, are
still not comprehensive enough (metadata, hashes, ﬁle
systems, and operating systems were some missing ﬁelds)
(Castle and Metz, 2015). We decided CybOX embodied the
most comprehensive taxonomic objects/ﬁelds out of current options and offered a couple improvements (again, it
could be substituted or used alongside another schema).
First, dynamic ﬁelds need to be implemented in a manner
which creates clear subﬁelds, requiring the logger to
choose one and input a correct format, enabling direct
comparison of CuFAs. Second, using a linked-list might
improve the investigative manner in which artifact
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Fig. 8. The proposed ontological model uses CybOX object to ﬁll speciﬁc low-level ﬁelds while the Location type attempts to create high-level categorization. All
requirements must be met for an object to be considered a CuFA (except location; see the Ontological model section). The Object type requirement ﬁeld at the end
of the arrow illustrates inheritance from the CybOX object (beginning of arrow).

databases are used even further, by allowing the logic of an
investigation to be retraced from CuFA to CuFA.
Finally, a procedure for curation was identiﬁed via survey responses, creating guidelines users of a CuFA database
should use to investigate, log, and search. These contributions will increase efﬁciency and allow better sharing of
data, and may facilitate research on “digital evolution” over
time/versions.
This initial work may not be enough to create standards
immediately. A more comprehensive and larger survey
would solidify ﬁndings. Thus, we call for collaboration between organizations to attempt to use our ﬁndings to
develop a more inclusive mechanism for creating a standardized deﬁnition. Regardless, we hope the detailed-yetﬂexible nature of our model and the obvious trends in
deﬁnitions/usage will drive discussion and future work to
mandate standards based on these ideas.
Future work
The example of Gene Ontology given by Brady et al.
(2014) supports the need for ﬁelds to be linked. Perhaps
the easiest way to do this in the future would be to have
two linkage boxes (in addition to a value box) for each ﬁeld
where one could select other ﬁelds from a dropdown menu

to indicate relation. Currently, the Artifact Genome Project
(AGP) is attempting to overcome some of the obstacles
involved in incorporating a more standardized implementation. It is based on our proposed deﬁnition and
model, and utilizes elements of CybOX (many of the CybOX
objects have already been discarded due to absorption by
other re-deﬁned objects, lack of utility in forensics, and
over-speciﬁcity). The AGP will attempt to create a repository of CuFAs available publicly for researchers, especially, and practitioners to log CuFAs and track
investigations via the CuFA linked-lists (effective techniques for recovering, copying, quarantining, and so on may
also be logged, in accordance with the procedure presented
in the Results). Although many tools, such as GRR, exist to
acquire and analyze artifacts the primary point of the AGP
will be to create a centralized database regardless of type of
tools used in the process. It will also help to standardize the
way people upload and categorize CuFAs, helping to reduce
wasted time searching for desired types of items. One way
it will do this is to pull up possible CybOX objects based on
the ﬁelds users enter, and then allow users to ﬂag the object
they select for different operating systems and levels of
legality (has the object ofﬁcially been used in a court of
law); selecting inappropriate object types will become less
common.
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Accompanying this advancement should also be tools to
facilitate the use of such databases. OSXAuditor was one
example: it helped to automatically search locations on a
running system/system image to ﬁnd items of interest,
extract them, and verify the reputation of ﬁles using VirusTotal, MHR, and Malware.lu (or your own database). It
could also aggregate logs from locations and put them into
a zipball. The ﬁnal results could be rendered as text or
HTML and sent to a Syslog server (Roberts, 2013). OSXAuditor is no longer maintained and has been set aside for
OSXCollector, an automated toolkit oriented towards
enabling analysts to answer questions, like how malware
got onto an infected computer, quicker. Its single Python
ﬁle creates a package of the collection (outputed to JSON)
and useful ﬁles like system logs to pass off to analysts who
can look through information on startup, quarantines,
operating system info, browsers, downloads, kernel extensions, ﬁle timestamps, etcetera (Yelp, 2016). Tools such

as this will be necessary in the future to expedite using
CuFA databases and allow investigators to focus on higher
levels of abstraction (at least when desired).
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Appendix
For a full explanation of this Appendix see the
Perspectives and usage section.

Items

Category

Paper & perspective

User credentials, personal details, activities, location; Activity timestamps;

Databases

Azfar et al., 2015
Researcher

Images;

Media

Opened/saved ﬁles; Email attachments; Skype log (chat & transfer); Index.dat
(downloads);
User assist (program launch); Last executed ﬁles by app; Run command
executed; App compatibility cache; Taskbar jump list; Prefetch/service event
logs;
Opened/saved ﬁelds; Last executed ﬁles by app; Recently opened ﬁles;
Shellbags; Shortcut ﬁles (LNK); Taskbar jump list; Prefetch ﬁles; IE history
ﬁles;
Search assistant/history; Keywords search from Start Menu; Last executed ﬁles
by app; Hidden ﬁles in dir (Thumbs.db); Recycle bin; IE history ﬁles;
Current system timezone; Network history; IE cookies; Time website visited;
USB key identiﬁcation; USB device plug & play times; GUID of mounted devices;
Volume serial number; Drive letter & volume name; Shortcut link ﬁles (LNK);
Plug & play event log;
Last password change; Last login; Successful/failed login; Login types for
account; Remote desktop usage;
IE history; IE cookies; IE cache ﬁles for web content; Automatic crash recovery;
Local stored object & ﬂash; Network history;

File download

Contact details & proﬁle; Picture URLs; Photo uploads; Comments posted;
Timestamps; Previously logged in users; Friends with active chat; Created
albums; Pictures viewed with app; Mailbox/chat messages;
User names; Proﬁle picture URLs; Tweets posted; Other activity (e.g. device);
Usernames/passwords; Post comments; Timestamps; Cookies & cache ﬁles;

Facebook

Goh, 2014
Researcher

Program execution

Files created &
opened timeline
Deleted ﬁles
Physical location
Drive usage

Account usage
Browser usage

Mutawa et al., 2012
Researcher

Twitter
MySpace

Local folder; Metro apps; IE10 websites visited; Journal notes; Desktop tools;
Metro app web cache; Metro app cookies; Cache; Cookies; Microsoft folder;
Digital certiﬁcates; User contacts; Application settings;
Ntuser.dat; SAM; System; USB storage devices; Software;

Registry

Space carved from SSD; EFI-system objects from carving; Grub in boot sector;

Chrome operating system

User directory of Chrome ﬁles; Google website history; Bookmarks; Cookies;
Download, search, login history; Most visited websites; Cache;

Contained/inner items

Temporary content; User content; System support; System updates; File
timestamps;

Xbox One NTFS partitions

Moore et al., 2014*
Researcher

Bit assignments; Browsing content records; Database ﬁles; Page ﬁles; Log ﬁles;

Private browsing

Chivers, 2014
Researcher

Windows

Thomson, 2012
Researcher

Corbin, 2014
Researcher
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(continued )
Items

Category

Paper & perspective

Registry; Application data folder;

Google client-side

Gupta et al., 2013
Researcher

Keyword searches; Usernames/passwords; Most recently used/cache data;

Registry

Mee et al., 2006
Researcher

USB device database;

Database

Collie, 2013
Researcher

Text; Images; Sketches; Videos; Location data; Audio; Video;

Smartphone network trafﬁc

Walnycky et al., 2015
Researcher

Chat logs; User info in SQLite ﬁles;

Local

Application settings; Installation paths; Program compatibility assistant;
Magnetic/registry key links;
IE integration; Statistics; Open with list; Windows routing service tracing;
Remote access service tracing; File associations; Uninstallations;

Registry directory &
key/value
Other BitTorrent association

Lallie and Briggs, 2011*
Researcher

Apple system log; Crash reporter; Diagnostic messages; FSEvents API;
Preference settings; Saved application state; Spotlight; Swap ﬁles/paging/
cache; Temporary data;
Prefetch; Thumbnail cache; Paging ﬁle; Registry; Windows search;
Bash history; GVFS virtual ﬁle system; Recently used; X session manager;

OSX

Sandvik, 2013*
Researcher

Windows
Linux

Install path (install/delete); Registry keys (install/delete); Prefetch ﬁles (install/
delete/runtime); VDF signatures;

Virtual disk encryption tool

Lim et al., 2010
Researcher

User/attacker geoIP, source/private IP, SIP user agent, device, habits; Not found
401, 404; Options method;
Frame time; Source IP address; Destination IP address; SIP from/to; SIP contact;
SIP user agent via call-ID; Cseq; SDP owner, connection, session name, media
attributes; Info request/response;

Network trafﬁc

Psaroudakis et al., 2014*
Researcher

RAM; Swap ﬁles; Registry;

Accelerator Plus

Yasin et al., 2009
Researcher

Proxy settings; History of downloaded ﬁles; Files requested to download;
Incomplete downloaded ﬁles; Password protected websites; Site grabber;
Uninstall location;
Downloaded ﬁles; Site grabber; Uninstall process; Encrypted password storage;

Registry

Yasin et al., 2010
Researcher

Log ﬁles

Log analysis; RAM analysis;

Digsby messaging client

Yasin and Abulaish, 2013
Researcher

Registry keys/values; Directories & ﬁles;

Steganography

Zax and Adelstein, 2009
Researcher

Antivirus/quarantine-related; Authentication; Web browser; Conﬁguration/
registry ﬁles; Containers for execution events; External media data/events;
Log ﬁles; Memory/volatile data; Networking state; Running processes;
Installed software; System-related; User-related ﬁle/type/location;

GRR & ForensicArtifacts.com

Castle and Metz, 2015
Collector

Autorun locations; System preferences; System settings & info; Sleep/
hibernate/swap image ﬁle; Kernel extension; Software installation;
Miscellaneous system info; Networking;
Autorun locations; Users; User directories; Preferences; Logs; User accounts;
iDevice backup; Recent items; Miscellaneous;
iCloud; Skype; Safari; Firefox; Chrome; Mail;

System

Stirparo, 2015*
Collector

File downloads; Program execution; File opening/creation; Deleted ﬁle/ﬁle
knowledge; File physical location; USB/drive usage; Account usage; Browser
usage;

SIP/SDP header

User
Application
SANS cheat sheet

Lee, 2015
Collector

(continued on next page)

S136

V.S. Harichandran et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S125eS137

(continued )
Items

Category

Paper & perspective

File; Process; Win registry key; Win service; Win thread; Archive ﬁle; Mutex;
URI; Domain name, address, & hostname; Port; Network socket; Link; DNS
record; ARP cache; URL history; Email message; Socket address; Pipe; Win
mailslot; Win memory page region; Win ﬁlemapping; Semaphore; Win
event; Win critical section; Win handle; WHOIS;

CybOX objects

MITRE Corporation, 2015
Collector

Apple serial number ID; Mobile phone handset ID; Network address ID; SIM
card ID; USB device ID;
File system ID; IP address ID; SSID;

Device identiﬁer

Brady et al., 2014
Collector

Logical identiﬁer

IP addresses/domains; Mutexes; Open(ed) ﬁles; Services; Registry keys/values/
write times; System date; Process names/timestamps; Thread/network
timestamps; UserAssist last run times;
Event logs in XP; PE timestamps;

Volatility Timeliner

PDF, TXT, RTF, Ofﬁce, etc. ﬁles;

Document ﬁles

USB devices; File system info; Network share info; Link ﬁles (shortcuts); User
accounts; Startup items; OS info; Shellbags; JUmplists; Event logs; Prefetch
ﬁles; Timezone info;
Outlook web app & email client; Microsoft sharepoint; Mbox email;
Microsoft Lync/OCS;
Calendar; Call logs; Contacts; iMessage/SMS; Native notes;
SMS & voicemail; Browser; Cell.cache & Wiﬁ.cache; Maps; Pictures; Notes;
Contacts & call logs; Downloads; Email; Application snapshots; iOS owner
info, notes, wiﬁ/Bluetooth info, user word dictionary, spotlight searches,
calendar events, installed applications;
Network connections; Running processes; Connected network shares/drives;
Alert on remote connections; Network interfaces; Logged on users;
Scheduled tasks; Services;
Instant messaging chats; Media; P2P ﬁle sharing; Social networking sites;
Webmail applications; Web-related activities; Webpage recovery; Xbox;

Windows
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